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Abstract 
Purpose. The process of value creation is rapidly shifting from a product- and firm-centric 
view to personalized consumer experiences. Networked and active consumers are increasingly 
co-creating value with the firm. This paper aims at contributing to the evidence on unpaid 
competing complementors and on network effects by asking how a form of creation that is 
user-driven and not motivated by sales incentives, impacts on producers’ sales. The video 
game industry, where the so-called “modders” provide free contents (“mods”) that improve 
the video game experience, provides an excellent field of study. 
Methodology. The video games demand function and the supply of new mods, in the retail 
video game market, are modelled. A system of equations is estimated by applying an 
instrumental-variables approach to account for possible endogeneity biases and uncover 
causal relationship. 
Findings. The creation of new mods increases video game retail sales. The more popular is 
a video game title, the higher are the sales. The video game demand elasticity is attenuated by 
the continuous creation of new mods. 
Practical implications This paper shows that direct and indirect network effects between 
video games and mods take place even with unpaid competing complementors and that (even) 
traditional distribution outlets can benefit from them. 
Originality/value. The paper quantifies the effect that the creation of mods exerts on sales 
and on price elasticity. Weekly (instead of monthly) time periods provide a period short 
enough to capture the short development cycles of mods and small and rapid responses of 
user demand. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Information technology has deeply changed the way producers and consumers interact, 
enabling new forms of collaboration in the product development process (Füller et al., 2010) 
and redefining the whole concept of consumer (Cova and Dalli, 2009). 
The interactions between user and producer innovation give rise to a new “user and 
producer innovation paradigm”, in which the traditional microeconomic demand side of the 
market becomes a source of innovative designs and product (Gambardella et al., 2016). From 
the point of view of producers, consumer innovators have two linked and opposite attributes, 
one positive and one negative. On the one hand, they can develop new product designs of 
potential commercial value, thus enhancing the producer’s R&D outcomes. On the other 
hand, their ability to create by themselves goods they should otherwise buy can reduce the 
producer’s market. As a consequence, producers can either compete with consumer 
innovators by internally developing solutions that substitute for any potential contributions 
from the user domain, or they can conduct in-house R&D activities that are complementary to 
user innovation. In this second case, new models of knowledge creation may emerge, where 
firms encourage consumer innovation as part of their business strategy (Lee and Cole, 2003) 
and outsource part of the entire innovation process to digital consumer communities (Arakji 
and Lang, 2007). 
The literature on network effects, and in particular that on indirect network effects, 
provides support to the consumer innovation phenomenon that concerns the creation of 
complementary goods. Positive (negative) network effects arise when the consumer utility of 
using a product or service increases (decreases) with the number of users of that product or 
service. A good exhibits indirect network effects if the demand for that good depends on the 
provision of one or more complementary goods, which in turn depends on demand for the 
original good. Shankar and Bayus (2003) suggest that network effects are a function of both 
network size (i.e. customer base) and network strength (the marginal impact of a unit increase 
in network size on demand). Network effects could also be “interactive”, when they operate 
through the interaction of user base with one or more marketing mix variables such as price 
and advertising. If the agents demanding the original and the complementary goods interact 
through an intermediary or platform, a multi-sided market takes place where both same-side 
(direct), cross-side (indirect) and interactive network effects possibly exist. 
The existence of regular two or multi sided-network effects relies on two assumptions: 
first, users prefer platforms with many complementors and second, complementors’ 
incentives to develop will be higher for a platform with many users, who represent a larger 
potential market. The peculiarity of the consumer innovation phenomenon is that in most 
cases contributors do not receive any payment for their work so that the second assumption is 
missing: complementors are motivated by their own interest on the product and on the 
improvement of their user experience, by their identification in a network community as well 
as by the desire to signal their skills to the public. Indeed, recent research has questioned the 
achievement of network effects under arrangements in which complementors are motivated 
by factors other than sales and are consequently making offers to platform users at sub-
competitive, i.e. zero, charges (Boudreau and Jeppesen, 2015). More precisely, signalling and 
reputational motivations are a plausible driver of development activity as platforms grow 
larger but any positive responses to platform growth may face an opposing negative effect as 
many independent competing complementors will suffer for limited attention and anyone’s 
signal may degenerate along with increasing noise and confusion. As a result, no overall 
network effect may occur. 
This paper aims at contributing to the limited evidence on unpaid competing 
complementors and on possibly countervailing network effects. In our empirical model, we 
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explore the interplay of three key variables. The first one captures the intensity of 
complementor incentives to invest in development by tracking the creation of new 
complements. The second one refers to the decreasing attention complementors receive as far 
as the size of the complementor crow increases and, possibly, the complements’ development 
rate decreases. The third and key variable is the user demand, which is expected to positively 
respond to growth on the complements side of the platform. Quite surprisingly, previous 
empirical research has taken for granted the positive reaction of demand to the increase in 
complementary goods within the user and producer innovation paradigm. The assessment of 
overall network effects in a user-complemented market must take into account all possible 
interactions between final users, complementors and complements and clearly identify the 
contribution of both network size and network strength. From the methodological point of 
view, a system of equations is estimated by applying an instrumental-variables approach via 
three-stage least squares to account for possible endogeneity biases and uncover causal 
relationship. 
 
 
2. User innovation in the videogames industry 
 
This paper investigates how a form of innovation that is user-driven and not motivated by 
sales incentives, impacts on producers’ sales. To this goal, the video game industry provides 
an excellent field of study. Despite receiving less attention from marketing researchers than 
other industry such as music and movies, it has grown into one of the largest and most 
profitable entertainment industries (2013’s worldwide sales amounted to more than 80 million 
dollars, almost the same as the movie industry) and presents a high degree of innovation and 
dynamics (Marchand and Hennig-Thurau, 2013). More importantly, it offers an example of 
vibrant online communities contributing to the production process with free labour, 
“voluntarily given and unwaged, enjoyed and exploited” (Postigo, 2003). In fact, games are 
suitable platforms for user creativity and the so called practice of modding – the act of 
modifying an existing hardware or software consumer good – intensely permeates the 
modern-day game culture (Nieborg and Van der Graaf, 2008; Jeppesen, 2004). Building on 
existing computer game titles, some users – so called modders, or complementors – modify 
the original source-code in order to perform functions not necessarily authorized or imagined 
by the original manufacturer, to respond to their personal preferences or to create entirely 
different gaming experiences (Münch, 2013). These modifications, usually abbreviated as 
mods, can range from minor alterations (e.g. add-ons, patch) to more extensive variations 
such as partial or total conversion and, once generated, are made available to the online 
community for free as complementary contents to the original PC version of the game. Within 
the user and producer innovation paradigm (Gambardella et al., 2016), mods represent a 
“user-complemented market”, as they are user-created complements, involving modifications 
built onto or into producer products, and are diffused peer to peer. 
From the game producers’ perspective, digital modders represent an opportunity to 
increase profits and stimulate demand (Jeppesen, 2004). Arakji and Lang (2007) argue that 
firms should stimulate consumer driven innovation either by opening (at least partially) 
proprietary content to modders or by promoting some form of rewards to the best modders. 
Postigo (2003) underlines that software production is driven by rapid and continuous 
innovation and short market-life and, to this regard, the work of hobbyist can help extending 
the life of game beyond their natural limits. 
Stimuli to the demand may also come from the network effects (Economides, 1996; 
Rysman, 2009). In the video games industry, positive network externalities may arise when 
the gaming experience improves, or when the probability of starting to play increases, due to 
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an increase in the number of users. While this is evident for multi-player game modes, it 
could also happen in single-player games as a result of the game popularity. In this sense, if 
mods increase the video games user base, they can also indirectly enhance the network effect. 
Shankar and Bayus (2003) find evidence of network effects in the home video game platforms 
(Sega and Nintendo), showing both a direct effect of installed customer base and an indirect 
effect through reduced price elasticity and improved advertising effectiveness. On the 
contrary, focusing specifically on the role of unpaid producer of complementary goods in 
multi-sided networks, Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015) did not find evidence of overall network 
effects in multi-player online game platforms. In particular, the authors show that the 
development rates and the number of complementors increase with the platform usage, 
apparently suggesting the presence of a network effect. However, such effect is countervailed 
by the fact that motivation in unpaid complementors – and thus development rates – might 
decrease due to large numbers of complementors competing for a limited audience. 
Differently from previous works, this paper focuses on the demand estimation of computer 
video game titles rather than platforms. The following hypotheses are tested in the empirical 
analysis. 
H1: The intensity of user innovation stimulates the demand. 
H1a: User innovation has a positive impact on sales. 
H1b: User innovation reduces the price elasticity of the demand. 
H2: In markets with user-generated complements, network effects are asymmetric: they arise 
on the users’ side but not on the complementors’ side. 
H2a: User base has a positive impact on sales. 
H2b: The number of complementors has a negative impact on the generation of new 
complements. 
Figure 1 represents the interaction between complementors, complements and final users in 
terms of network effects. 
 
Figure 1. Hypotheses on network effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Dataset 
 
The initial dataset was collected by GfK Italy and includes information on 5 single player, 
best-selling video games sold in Italy through retailers (thus excluding on-line sales), from the 
12th week of 2006 to the 48th week of 2014. The initial week of the sample period reflects 
the earliest release date of the games included in the sample, the latest week is the last one for 
which the information on sales and price was provided by GfK1. For each version of a video 
                                                          
1 Data are confidential and the games’ real titles could not be displayed due to privacy reasons. 
+ 
H2a 
- 
H2b 
+ 
H1 
User base New users 
Complementors New complements 
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game (standard release or limited and collector editions), identified by a European Article 
Number (EAN) code, the initial dataset included weekly sales, unit price and total units sold 
by platform (PC or PS3, X360, DS console) in the Italian retail market. 
To investigate the impact of users’ innovation on the video game demand, information 
about the number of available mods for each game in each time period was added and has 
made this dataset unique. The games are similar for genre (action or adventure) and popularity 
both in terms of sales volume and in terms of number of mods, which are mostly made 
available through the Nexusmods.com and the Moddb.com fan sites. The concentration of 
mods in few databases facilitated the collection and the validity of information: for each (PC 
version’s) EAN, the weekly number of new mods created, chosen among the 300 most 
popular ones, were tracked together with the corresponding number of weekly downloads. 
The popularity of mods was measured at the end of 2014 by the number of users’ 
endorsements for the Nexusmods.com’s mods and, in absence of information about 
endorsements, by the total number of downloads for the Moddb.com’s ones. Data referred to 
similar versions were aggregated under a unique EAN (sales and weekly new mods were 
summed up, while prices were averaged across versions). The final sample is an unbalanced 
panel identified by 16 distinct EANs ordered by week (from that of release to the latest with 
positive sales, whose maximum is equal to 453) and resulting in 5199 EAN-week 
observations.  
We infer the variation in the intensity of user innovation from changes in the rates of new 
complementary development, represented by the number of mods made available each week 
for the PC versions of each title and captured by the variable modnew. Since the mods are 
targeted for the PC version of the video game, variable modnew has observations for the 
EANs referred to the PC platform only (5 EANs and 1610 EAN-week observations)2. 
Following Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015), the cumulative number of mods (variable modcum) 
is used as a proxy for the number of complementors. For the 5 PC platform EANs, along with 
the number of units weekly sold (variable units) and the average weekly price (variable 
pricePC), the database includes a variable priceCON capturing the average weekly price 
charged for the corresponding non-PC platforms’ EANs. 
A descriptive analysis of data (not shown) would highlights that the distribution of sales 
across time is skewed to the right and concentrates in the first three months after release but 
shows regular peaks during the Christmas season. In the context of the overall decline of the 
retail market, it is not immediate to detect a relationship between units sold and mods, and the 
causality direction itself is not clear. On the one hand, the availability of new, free of charge, 
mods can increase the appeal of the original product and attract new users. On the other hand, 
a greater number of units sold implies an expansion of the users’ community network and 
spurs the developers’ incentives to generate new mods. To capture the network effect 
generating from the platform’s usage, two additional variables were created, the first one 
focusing on the PC platform only (KPC) and the second one on all but the PC platforms 
(KCON), respectively defined as the cumulative number of PC or console units sold at each 
time period. 
Table 1 summarizes the list of abbreviations for the variable names used in the paper, 
along with their detailed description. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The issue of cross-platform portability of mods is complex, in any cases it is reasonable to assume 
that the main impact of the creation of new mods concerns the PC version of video games. 
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Table 1. List of variables 
 
Variable Description 
units Number of PC game units sold by EAN 
pricePC Average PC game’s price (euro) 
priceCON Average console game’s price (euro) 
KPC Cumulative number of PC game units sold 
KCON Cumulative number of console game units sold 
modnew Number of new mods 
modcum Cumulative number of mods 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
The starting point of the empirical strategy is modelling the demand function in the retail 
video game market. In this way, we can obtain an estimate of the impact of the intensity of 
users’ innovation on the video game demand (H1), as well as an initial evaluation of the game 
network effect on the user side (H2a). In Equation [1], units depend on modnew (lagged by 
one week in order to reduce the risk of endogeneity), and on the user network base, KPC. 
 
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐾𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡) + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         [1] 
 
The own-price and cross-price elasticities can be estimated including both the average 
price of each title’s PC versions (pricePC) and that of the console equivalent versions 
(priceCON). To capture the possibility that a novel offer of complementary goods positively 
affects the demand of video games by also reducing the video game’s own-price elasticity, we 
include the interaction term pricePC*modnew (H1b). Finally, the panel structure of the data is 
exploited by using time-period and EAN fixed effects to unambiguously control for cross-
sectional variations and general macro industry trends (in the model, terms 𝜋𝑖 and 𝜎𝑡, 
respectively). 
Together with Equation [1], we want to explore the determinants of modnew, questioning 
the achievement of network effects on the complementors’ side. Therefore, two additional 
equations are included in the system: 
 
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜌𝐾𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑡    [2] 
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝜏𝐾𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡      [3] 
 
In Equation [2], the users’ network base (KPC), represented by all clients that have already 
bought a PC version copy of the video game title, is supposed to be positively related with the 
potential appeal of the video games market, thus providing incentive to the creation of new 
mods; nevertheless, at the same time, the cumulative number of the already generated mods 
might discourage the creation of new ones, acting as a competitive threat (H2b) to the 
developers. In turn, Equation [3] models modcum itself as a function of the network base. 
The system of equations [1]-[2]-[3] can be estimated via the three-stage least squares 
procedure. An important issue concerns the treatment of the possible endogeneity of the KPC 
variable. To this regard, the peculiarity of our database offers an interesting solution, since for 
each title and week, the information on video games sales for non-PC platforms (captured by 
the variable KCON, the cumulative number of console game units sold) is available. Such 
variable provides an alternative proxy of the video game title popularity, which is certainly 
correlated to the PC platform user base but not directly correlated either with the number of 
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weekly units bought for PC or with the number of mods (modnew and modcum), given that 
mods are not specifically designed for console platforms. Thus, KCON has been used as an 
instrumental variable for KPC. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the three-stage least squares estimates. The model fit is 
satisfactory and the estimation procedure addresses the issue of potential endogeneity of the 
user base (KPC) by using as instrumental variable the user base over all but PC platforms 
(KCON). Column (1) presents the determinants of retail sales. 
 
Table 2. Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES unitst modnewt modcumt 
    
modnewt-1 8.515***   
 (2.212)   
KPCt 0.00163*** 6.47e-05*** 0.00243*** 
 (0.000568) (8.30e-06) (7.28e-05) 
pricePCt -1.777***   
 (0.517)   
priceCONt 2.294***   
 (0.843)   
pricePCt*modnewt 0.312***   
 (0.0518)   
modcumt  -0.0219***  
  (0.00205)  
Constant  6.595***  
  (1.312)  
Time dummies yes yes yes 
EAN dummies yes yes yes 
Observations 1,605 1,605 1,605 
R-squared 0.829 0.477 0.961 
 
Three-stage least squares estimation. 
The dependent variables are the number of PC game versions’ units sold (units, model 1), the number of new mods created 
every week (modnew, model 2) and the cumulative number of mods (modcum, model 3). KPC is the cumulative number of 
PC game units sold and it has been instrumented through the variable KCON, the cumulative number of console game units 
sold. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The lagged number of modnew captures the impact of user innovation and its positive and 
significant coefficient indicates that, as expected, new complements stimulate the market 
demand for the original game title (H1a). This implies that the unpaid contribution of 
modders generate free returns for the retailers. The negative sign of the interaction terms 
pricePC*modnew strengthens this result, indicating that the video game demand elasticity is 
attenuated by the continuous creation of mods (H1b). In the context of the typical dynamics 
observed in the video game industry, where new titles tend to exhibit a short market-life, this 
represents a key strategic opportunity. In the presence of intense users’ innovation, the life 
cycle of the product is enhanced and strategies based on price promotions can be postponed.  
In addition, the more popular is a title, the higher are the sales on PC, as the positive and 
significant coefficient of KPC shows (H2a). Thus, new mods produce new sales, implying 
higher user base and setting conditions for further sales. 
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Column (2) and (3) extend the model by exploring, respectively, the determinants of new 
complements (modnew) and the cumulated number of complements (modcum). Results are 
consistent with Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015) and provide support to H2b: while user base is 
positively related with complements, the generation of new complements reduces with the 
increase of complementors. As the user base increases by one unit, the cumulated number of 
complements increases by 0.00243, which in turn generates a decrease in the generation of 
new complements by 0.00243*0.0219=5.3217e-05; this compensates the direct effect that a 
unitary increase in the user base has on the generation of new mods, 6.47e-05 (the difference 
is not statistically significant). 
As a consequence, although user-base innovation is not self-propelling, it helps videogame 
producers to attract new users thus contrasting the natural decline in revenues that 
characterize entertainment products. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and future research 
 
The paper presents an original analysis of the video game demand and quantifies the effect 
that the creation of mods exerts on sales. Previous works do not include demand estimates in 
the assessment of network effects and make use of monthly observations of mods at best (for 
example, Boudreau and Jeppesen, 2015). Weekly time periods provide a period short enough 
to capture the short development cycles of mods and even small and rapid responses of user 
demand. 
Game developers can benefit from the vitality of user community and should therefore 
favour the creation of a collaborative environment among players. In fact, the active 
participation of users and fans, perfectly aware of the consumers’ needs, can drive the 
realization of successful complementary contents that significantly improve the quality of the 
product. Such contents, available for free, provide an impulse to the original video game 
demand and force retailers to renew their strategies in a sector that is usually characterized by 
short market-life and rapidly falling prices. Firms can encourage digital user innovation by 
opening, at least partially, proprietary contents to modders and by promoting competitive 
rewards to the best modders. Of course, the risk associated to the opening of intellectual 
property must be carefully evaluated. Comino and Manenti (2011) show that an appropriate 
definition of the licensing terms of distribution of open source software help firms balance the 
opposing effect of going open source. 
The paper presents some limitations that future research could usefully address. At the 
present, the results refer to a limited number of video games. An increase in sample size to 
include a greater number of video games’ titles is likely to reinforce the conclusions of the 
analysis. In addition, the present analysis refers to the Italian retail market and disregard 
online sales, that nonetheless constitute a great part of the industry revenues. 
 
 
References 
 
Arakji, R., Lang, K. (2007). Digital consumer networks and producer-consumer collaboration: 
Innovation and product development in the video game industry. Journal of Management 
Information Systems 24 (2), 195-219 
Boudreau, K.J., Jeppesen, L.B. (2015). Unpaid crowd complementors: The platform network 
effect mirage. Strategic Management Journal 36 (12), 1761-1777 
Comino, S., Manenti, F.M. (2011). Dual licensing in open source software markets. 
Information Economics and Policy 23, 234-242. 
 9  
Cova, B., Dalli, D. (2009). Working consumers: the next step in marketing theory? Marketing 
Theory 9, 315-339 
Economides, N. (1996). The economics of networks. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 14, 673-699 
Füller, J., Mühlbacher, H., Matzler, K., Jawecki, G. (2010). Consumer empowerment through 
internet-based co-creation. Journal of Management Information Systems 26 (3), 71–102 
Gambardella, A., Raasch, C., Von Hippel, E. (2016). The User Innovation Paradigm: 
Implications for Markets and Welfare. Management Science, Article in advance, pp. 1-19, 
available at http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2393 
Jeppesen, L.B. (2004). Profiting from innovative user communities. Working paper, 
Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School 
Lee, G.K, Cole, R.E. (2003). From a firm-based to a community-based model of knowledge 
creation: the case of the Linux kernel development. Organization Science 14 (6), 633-649 
Marchand, A., Hennig-Thurau, T. (2013). Value creation in the video game industry: Industry 
economics, consumer benefits, and research opportunities. Journal of Interactive 
Marketing, 141-157 
Münch, M. (2013). Fooling the user? Modding in the video game industry. Internet Policy 
Review 2 (2) 
Nieborg, D.B., Van der Graaf, S. (2008). The mod industries? The industrial logic of non-
market game production. European Journal of Cultural Studies 11 (2), 177-195 
Postigo, H. (2003). From pong to planet quake: Post industrial transitions from leisure to 
work. Information, Communication & Society 6 (4), 593-607 
Rysman, M. (2009). The economics of two-sided markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
23 (3), 125-143 
Shankar V, Bayus B.L. (2003). Network effects and competition: an empirical analysis of the 
home video game industry. Strategic Management Journal 24(4), 375–384  
 10  
 
